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Academic dishonesty (cheating) has been prevalent on college campuses for 
decades, and the percentage of students reporting cheating varies by college major. 
This study, based on a survey of 643 undergraduate engineering majors at 11 
institutions, used two parallel hierarchical multiple regression analyses to predict the 
frequency of cheating on exams and the frequency of cheating on homework based 
on eight blocks of independent variables: demographics, pre-college cheating 
behavior, co-curricular participation, plus ﬁve blocks organized around Ajzen’s 
Theory of Planned Behavior (moral obligation not to cheat, attitudes about cheating, 
evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of cheating, perceived social pressures to cheat 
or not to cheat, and perceived effectiveness of academic dishonesty policies). The 
ﬁnal models signiﬁcantly predict 36% of the variance in ‘‘frequency of cheating on 
exams’’ and 14% of the variance in ‘‘frequency of cheating on homework’’. Students 
don’t see cheating as a single construct and their decisions to cheat or not to cheat 
are inﬂuenced differently depending on the type of assessment. Secondary ﬁndings 
are that a student’s conviction that cheating is wrong no matter what the 
circumstances is a strong deterrent to cheating across types of assessment and 
that a student who agrees that he/she would cheat in order to alleviate stressful 
situations is more likely to cheat on both exams and homework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Academic dishonesty, or cheating, is widespread on college campuses 
throughout the United States (McCabe and Drinan, 1999). Reported 
percentages vary widely, although the percentages remained consistent 
over 30 years in the only known replication study. In 1993, McCabe 
worked with Bowers to resurvey nine of the schools that Bowers had 
surveyed in 1963. Although Bowers received responses from 5422 stu­
dents at 99 institutions, the subset of these at the nine schools that 
McCabe resurveyed consisted of 452 responses (D.L. McCabe, personal 
communication, April 1, 2002). This study, replicated over time, indi­
cates that the percentage of undergraduates self-reporting engagement in 
various cheating behaviors during college has not changed substantially 
from Bower’s 1963 survey (82% of 452 respondents) to McCabe and 
Trevino’s 1993 survey (84% of 1793 respondents) (McCabe, 1997). The 
steady percentage of self-reported cheating has been substantiated by a 
meta-analysis (Brown and Emmett, 2001) and an additional study 
(Spiller and Crown, 1995). However, the severity of the cheating has 
increased substantially. McCabe (1997) oﬀers examples: 
For example, students admitting to copying from another student on an examina­
tion doubled from 26% to 52% between 1963 and 1993. Instances of helping some­
one else cheat on an examination and the use of crib notes each increased more than 
50%. McCabe and Trevino also observed a four-fold increase (from 11% to 49%) 
in the number of students who admitted they had collaborated on assignments when 
the instructor had specifically asked for individual work. (p. 435) 
Ten studies indicate that the percentage of undergraduates reporting 
engagement in various cheating behaviors diﬀers by college major 
(Baird, 1980; Bowers, 1964; Brown, 1996; Harp and Taietz, 1966; Jack­
son, Levine, Furnham, and Burr, 2002; McCabe, 1997; Newstead, 
Franklyn-Stokes, and Armstead, 1996; Rawwas and Isakson, 2000; 
Roberts, Anderson, and Yanish, 1997; Shaughnessy, 1988). The ﬁndings 
are consistent: percentages of undergraduates reporting cheating are 
highest for those enrolled in ‘‘vocationally oriented majors such as busi­
ness and engineering’’ (McCabe, 1997, p. 444), where business majors 
report the highest levels. McCabe collected survey data from 1,946 
undergraduates at 16 highly selective institutions in 1995--1996, includ­
ing questions about engagement during college in ﬁve diﬀerent cheating 
behaviors on examinations, four diﬀerent cheating behaviors on writing 
assignments, plus collaboration with other students on assignments 
when the instructor wanted individual work. Percentages of students 
reporting any type of cheating on the survey diﬀered signiﬁcantly 
(p<.05) by college major: business (91%), engineering (82%), social sci­
ences (73%), and natural sciences (71%). 
The prevalence and increasing severity of cheating should be distress­
ing to educators because of their implications. First, most U.S. colleges 
and universities have a mission that includes preparation for citizenship, 
character development, moral leadership, and/or service to society; each 
of these has a moral dimension (King and Mayhew, 2002; Whitley and 
Keith-Spiegel, 2002). Prevalent undergraduate cheating undermines 
eﬀorts to accomplish such missions. Also, in professions such as engi­
neering, there is a growing, nationwide emphasis on graduating students 
who understand professional and ethical responsibility (Stark and Lat­
tucca, 1997). Prevalent academic dishonesty indicates that many stu­
dents will approach learning experiences in professional ethics with 
attitudes and habits that may interfere with their learning. Thus, inter­
ventions that eﬀectively encourage a student not to cheat during college 
could help institutions fulﬁll their missions. 
Second, acts of academic dishonesty undermine the validity of mea­
sures of student learning. This, in turn, interferes with faculty’s ability 
to correctly diagnose gaps in student learning for the purpose of both 
re-teaching current students and re-designing instruction for future stu­
dents. Whitley and Keith-Spiegel (2002) make related claims that cheat­
ing undermines equity in grading and the mission to transfer knowledge. 
Third, there are several costs to the entire educational enterprise that 
result from high levels of cheating. Student and faculty morale, the rep­
utation of the institution, and public conﬁdence in higher education are 
all damaged by rampant cheating, especially when it is ignored by 
faculty and administrators (Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002). Any inter­
ventions that eﬀectively encourage a student not to cheat during college 
could increase the validity of measures of student learning and 
also reduce damage to morale, institutional reputations, and public 
conﬁdence in higher education. 
Fourth, research has shown that students who cheat in college are 
more likely to cheat in graduate and professional schooling (Baldwin, 
Daugherty, Rowley, and Schwartz, 1996), to engage in unethical work­
place behavior (Harding, Carpenter, Finelli, and Passow, 2003, 2004; 
Hilbert, 1985; Nonis and Swift, 2001; Ogilby, 1995; Sims, 1993; Todd-
Mancillas, 1987), to shoplift (Beck and Ajzen, 1991), to cheat on income 
taxes (Fass, 1990), and to abuse substances (Blankenship and Whitley, 
2000; Kerkvliet, 1994). For college graduates whose workplace had a 
strong corporate code of ethics, employees whose undergraduate school 
had an honor code were less likely than graduates of non-code schools 
to report engaging in unethical workplace behavior (McCabe, Trevino, 
and Butterﬁeld, 1996). Note that much lower rates of cheating are 
reported by students at honor code schools (McCabe and Trevino, 
1993). All of these correlations, though not known to be causal, raise 
the possibility that interventions that eﬀectively encourage a student not 
to cheat during college could reduce the frequency of his or her deci­
sions to engage in other unethical behavior during college and beyond. 
These four implications of the prevalence and severity of cheating 
have inspired a substantial body of research on cheating among college 
students. Eleven reviews (including three meta-analyses) of college 
cheating behavior have been published since 1977 (Brown and Emmett, 
2001; Bushway and Nash, 1977; Cizek, 1999; Cole and McCabe, 1996; 
Crown and Spiller, 1998; Dowd, 1992; Kibler, 1993; McCabe, Trevino, 
and Butterﬁeld, 2001; Whitley, 1998; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002; 
Whitley, Nelson, and Jones, 1999). There are three veins of published 
studies, addressing three diﬀerent overarching goals: (1) documenting 
the prevalence of college student cheating to establish the importance of 
the problem, (2) understanding the factors that inﬂuence students’ deci­
sions to cheat (or correlates of cheating), and (3) informing faculty and 
institutional policy for preventing cheating and for handling cheating 
incidents when they occur. As will be explained in the literature review, 
most literature pertaining to policy separates the construct of cheating 
into more speciﬁc behaviors on speciﬁc types of assessments, such as 
plagiarism on term papers and copying answers from other students on 
homework (Cizek, 1999; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002). However, 
most studies aimed at documenting prevalence and understanding corre­
lates of cheating combine cheating behaviors on an assortment of 
assessments into a single measure of cheating, presenting an unfortunate 
obstacle to informing policy. 
The purpose of our survey study was to understand the factors that 
explain the frequency of cheating by undergraduate engineering students 
on two types of assessments: exams and homework. To this end, we 
identiﬁed two dependent variables for use in this study: frequency of 
cheating on exams and frequency of cheating on homework. The blocks 
of independent variables used in the two analyses were demographics, 
pre-college cheating behavior, co-curricular participation, plus ﬁve 
blocks organized around the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; 
Beck and Ajzen, 1991): moral obligation not to cheat; attitudes about 
cheating; evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of cheating; perceived 
social pressures to cheat or not to cheat; and perceived eﬀectiveness of 
academic dishonesty policies. The sample selection controlled for the 
students’ major. A secondary purpose of our study was to test Ajzen’s 
theory of planned behavior (TPB) for predicting cheating behavior. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed to determine 
how blocks of variables organized around the TPB work together to 
predict the two dependent variables. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we explain how we selected the TPB for organizing 
our independent variable in our respective models, and we describe the 
constructs in the theory and the construct we use to modify the basic 
theory. Next, we explain why we selected dependent variables based on 
the type of assessment by showing how the TPB, previous empirical 
work on cheating, and policy discussions pertaining to cheating all indi­
cate that a decision to cheat is highly aﬀected by the type of assessment. 
Then, we describe how we selected independent variables guided by the 
TPB and previous research on cheating. Finally, we share our rationale 
for selecting a sample composed entirely of engineering undergraduates. 
The Theory of Planned Behavior 
Two recent reviews of cheating among college students (Crown and 
Spiller, 1998; Whitley, 1998) each cite over 100 relevant studies pub­
lished from 1970 to 1997. Only a few of the studies have used a theoret­
ical framework to explain or predict cheating among college students. 
Theoretical frameworks used include models of deviance (used by Gene­
reux and McLeod, 1995; Liska, 1978; Michaels and Miethe, 1989), 
deterrence theory (used by Buckley, Wiese, and Harvey, 1998; Cochran, 
Chamlin, Wood, and Sellers, 1999), cognitive consistency theory (used 
by Tang and Zuo, 1997), moral development models (used by Lanza-
Kaduce and Klug, 1986; Whitley and Kost, 1999), rational choice the­
ory (used by Buckley et al., 1998; Cochran et al., 1999; Tibbetts, 1997), 
anomie (used by Caruana, Ramaseshan, and Ewing, 2000), and the the­
ory of planned behavior (used by Beck and Ajzen, 1991; Genereux and 
McLeod, 1995; Nonis and Swift, 2001; Whitley, 1998) or its earlier ver­
sion, the theory of reasoned action (used by Pratt and McLaughlin, 
1989). Because a number of researchers have demonstrated its applica­
bility to academic cheating, we used the theory of planned behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991; Beck and Ajzen, 1991) as the theoretical framework for 
organizing our independent variables in our models.1 
Ajzen’s2 theory of planned behavior (TPB) postulates that human 
behavior is guided by rational decisions that are inﬂuenced by both the 
intention to perform the behavior and also a perception of control over 
the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Intention is determined by three compo­
nents: (1) attitude toward a behavior (Attitude), (2) perceived social 
pressures to engage in or not engage in the behavior (Subjective 
Norms), and (3) the perceived ease of performing the behavior 
(Perceived Behavioral Control). Note that beliefs are the antecedents of 
attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. ‘‘Beliefs 
about the likely [positive and negative] consequences or other attributes 
of the behavior (behavioral beliefs)’’ (Ajzen, 2002, p. 665) produce the 
attitude toward the behavior. ‘‘Beliefs about the normative expectations 
of other people (normative beliefs)’’ (p. 665) lead to subjective norms, 
and ‘‘beliefs about the presence of factors that may further or hinder 
performance of the behavior (control beliefs)’’ (p. 665) result in per­
ceived behavioral control. Further, perceived behavioral control is theo­
rized to have a direct inﬂuence on both actual behavior and intention. 
The direct inﬂuence of perceived behavioral control on actual behavior 
allows for the study of behaviors that are not under the complete voli­
tional control of the individual (Ajzen, 2002). Despite substantial sup­
port for the TPB as a means of predicting actual behavior (Armitage 
and Conner, 2001), research continues to examine variables that might 
enhance the predictive capabilities of the theory (Conner and Armitage, 
1998). For example, Beck and Ajzen concede that ‘‘understanding the 
determinants of dishonest behaviors can be more problematic than 
understanding performance of socially acceptable behaviors’’ (1991, 
p. 300). They propose that factors in addition to those encompassed by 
the TPB, such as moral obligation, may be critical in understanding 
cheating and other dishonest behaviors. We include moral obligation as 
a modifying construct in the TPB for the purpose of organizing our 
independent variables. 
Rationale for the Selection of Dependent Variables 
The TPB implies that the precursors of intention to act will vary by 
situation, and consideration of each construct (attitude, subjective 
norms, and perceived behavioral control) for diﬀerent assessment situ­
ations, such as exams and homework assignments, reveals that type of 
assessment should greatly aﬀect each construct in the TPB resulting in 
diﬀerent behaviors. This notion that the type of assessment will greatly 
aﬀect behavior has been veriﬁed by multiple veins of literature as 
described below and is the basis for the selection of our dependent 
variables: frequency of exam cheating and frequency of homework 
cheating. 
Empirical Evidence that Prevalence of Cheating is Aﬀected by the Type 
of Assessment 
Several studies have reported on prevalence of cheating separately by 
type of assessment, ﬁnding diﬀerences in rates of engagement by assess­
ment type (e.g., Baird, 1980; Bowers, 1964; Brown, 1996; Diekhoﬀ et al., 
1996; Hanson, 1990; Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, and Cauﬀman, 2002; 
McCabe, 1997; Michaels and Miethe, 1989; Stearns, 2001; Storch and 
Storch, 2002; data from McCabe�s 1993 study reported in Whitley and 
Keith-Spiegel, 2002). Also, research has shown that two components of 
the TPB as applied to cheating diﬀer by type of assessment: attitudes and 
perceived behavioral control. In the realm of attitude toward cheating 
behavior, two types of attitudes have been shown to diﬀer by type of 
assessment, speciﬁcally, general attitudes (Jordan, 2001; Lipson and 
McGavern, 1993; Michaels and Miethe, 1989; Newstead et al., 1996; 
Nuss, 1984; Thorpe, Pittenger, and Reed, 1999) and evaluation of costs, 
beneﬁts, and risks (Jensen et al., 2002; Lipson and McGavern, 1993; 
Michaels and Miethe, 1989). In the realm of perceived behavioral control, 
the ease or diﬃculty of performing the behavior has been shown to diﬀer 
by type of assessment (Lipson and McGavern, 1993). Although several 
studies have addressed perceived social pressures (subjective norms in the 
TPB) (e.g., Jordan, 2001; Newstead et al., 1996; Whitley and Kost, 1999), 
none were found that report pressures by type of assessment. 
Further evidence that prevalence of cheating is aﬀected by the type of 
assessment is provided by 30-year trends. In a 1993 study, McCabe, 
et al. (2001) replicated a 1963 survey (Bower, 1964) of nine state univer­
sities. McCabe et al. found that while the number of students reporting 
that they had copied on a test or exam doubled from 26% to 52%, the 
number who admitted to plagiarism declined slightly from 30% to 26%. 
Over the same period, the number of students who said that they had 
done un-permitted collaboration on assignments more than quadrupled 
from 11% to 49%. If the percentages had all risen or fallen in tandem, 
even if their values diﬀered in magnitude, the data might have indicated 
that these diﬀerent behaviors could and should be investigated as a 
single phenomenon. However, some fell as others rose and the changes 
occurred at diﬀerent rates, which indicates that these behaviors are 
controlled by diﬀerent mechanisms and should be studied separately. 
Treating ‘‘Cheating’’ as a Unitary Construct: A Flaw in Previous Research 
Thus, the TPB and empirical evidence both indicate that a decision to 
cheat is highly aﬀected by the type of assessment. As we explain in this 
section, research on academic dishonesty, or cheating, has often suﬀered 
from the indiscriminant combination of widely varying behaviors that are 
fundamentally diﬀerent. In this statement, we make two claims: (1) 
indiscriminant combination of behaviors is common in the literature, and 
(2) indiscriminant combination of behaviors is a problem because it treats 
fundamentally diﬀerent behaviors as unitary. Woven into our support for 
these claims, we supply evidence for the indiscriminant combination of 
behaviors in two of the three main veins of cheating research: prevalence 
and correlates of cheating. We also discuss the third vein—policy. 
A direct illustration of combining multiple behaviors into a single 
measure of cheating is Brown and Emmett’s (2001) review of empirical 
studies of the prevalence of cheating among college students. They iden­
tiﬁed 22 studies, published over 33 years, which simply summed 
responses for separate behaviors (2 to 36 behaviors, mean=11.5) to cre­
ate a single measure: ‘‘overall level of cheating’’ (p. 531). In the study 
that included 36 diﬀerent behaviors (Stern and Havlicek, 1986), three of 
the speciﬁc behaviors are ‘‘copying from another student during a quiz 
or examination’’ (p. 133), ‘‘working in a group on a homework assign­
ment that was assigned as individual work’’ (p. 134), and ‘‘‘making up’ 
sources for bibliographic citation’’ (p. 134). Respondents were asked 
about attitudes toward each behavior (i.e., whether or not the behavior 
is ‘‘academic misconduct’’ (p. 131)) and also about engagement in the 
behavior (i.e., whether or not the respondent had ‘‘done this at least 
once while in college’’ (p. 131)). Students classiﬁed the behaviors diﬀer­
ently: for one of the 36 behaviors, 7% classiﬁed it as misconduct while 
for another behavior 96% classiﬁed it as misconduct. Despite the wide 
range in perceptions about the behaviors, all 36 were combined into a 
single measure of ‘‘frequency of misconduct’’ (p. 138). 
A second illustration of combining multiple behaviors into a single 
measure of cheating is Whitley’s (1998) meta-analysis of empirical stud­
ies of correlates of cheating among college students. For the 107 studies 
reviewed, Whitley created a single dependent measure of prevalence of 
‘‘cheating’’ by combining 19 estimates of total cheating, 36 estimates of 
examination cheating, 12 estimates of homework cheating, and 9 
estimates of plagiarism. 
Such decisions to combine behaviors on all types of assessments into 
a single prevalence measure is typical of correlates research on cheating 
(e.g., Baird, 1980; Deikfhoﬀ et al., 1996; Jordan, 2001; McCabe and 
Trevino, 1997; Tang and Zuo, 1997). Typically, researchers choose to 
create a single prevalence measure as the dependent variable by combin­
ing all cheating behaviors, regardless of the type of the assessment. 
There is a notable exception to this trend of combining all behaviors 
into a single dependent variable. In a correlates study of cheating 
among college students, Pratt and McLaughlin (1989) used factor analy­
sis on 26 behaviors relating to assessments such as examinations, home­
work, and writing term papers to create four separate dependent 
variables relating to ‘‘obtaining help in an examination situation’’ 
(p. 203), ‘‘obtaining help outside of a test situation’’ (p. 203), ‘‘obtaining 
unfair credit...in nontest situations’’ (p. 203--204), and directly substitut­
ing for an assessment, such as one person taking an examination for 
another or submitting a paper that someone else wrote. They found that 
‘‘diﬀerent path models ﬁt diﬀerent types of behaviors’’ (p. 214) for the 
323 undergraduates in this multi-institutional study, substantiating our 
claim that prevalence of cheating is aﬀected by type of assignment. 
Summary: Why Research Should Distinguish Between Types 
of Assessments 
The TPB and empirical evidence both indicate that a decision to cheat is 
highly aﬀected by the type of assessment. Yet in two of the primary veins 
of cheating research, prevalence and correlates of cheating, cheating behav­
iors have almost always been combined indiscriminately. Recently concerns 
have been raised about this common practice by Crown and Spiller (1998), 
Whitley (1998), and Thorpe, et al. (1999) ‘‘treating all cheating behaviors as 
a whole may ignore important interactions among variables’’ (1999, p. 57). 
In the third primary vein of cheating literature, policy pertaining to 
cheating, classiﬁcations by type of assessment dominate discussions in 
areas such as prevention and detection, policy, working deﬁnitions, and 
strategies for teachers who must deal with academic dishonesty (Cizek, 
1999; Lipson and McGavern, 1993; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002). 
This dominance of categorization by type of assessment is echoed in 
two schemes for categorizing cheating behaviors. Pavela’s (1978) scheme 
distinguishes between two broad classes of assessments—‘‘cheating’’ and 
‘‘plagiarism’’—in addition to two types of behavior—‘‘facilitation’’ and 
‘‘fabrication’’. Whitley and Keith-Spiegel (2002) extend Pavela’s catego­
ries by specifying type of assessment, such as cheating on examinations 
and cheating on assignments. Collectively, studies in all three veins of 
cheating research demonstrate the need to use distinct dependent vari­
ables for each type of assessment in any research on cheating behavior. 
Thus, to evaluate whether the prevalence of cheating is aﬀected by 
type of assessment, we separated our analyses by type of assessment. Of 
the many available types of assessments, we chose two dependent 
variables: frequency of cheating on exams (an index of nine exam cheat­
ing behaviors from our survey) and frequency of cheating on homework 
(an index of four homework cheating behaviors) (Table 1). We selected 
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exams and homework because they are the backbone of assessment in 
many mathematics, science, and engineering courses. Surprisingly, home­
work cheating behaviors have almost never been distinctly included in 
cheating surveys. We selected only behaviors that at least 50% of the 
respondents deﬁned as either ‘‘cheating’’ or ‘‘unethical but not cheating’’ 
because previous research has shown that cheating is diﬃcult to deﬁne 
(e.g., Kibler, Nuss, Paterson, and Pavela, 1988; Ratner, 1996) and that 
students often do not deﬁne a behavior as cheating even when faculty do 
(e.g., Stern and Havlicek, 1986; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002). 
Rationale for the Selection of Independent Variables 
Our 139-item survey was designed based on a review of literature on 
academic dishonesty (Carpenter, Harding, Montgomery, and Steneck, 
2002; Harding, Carpenter, Montgomery, and Steneck, 2001). For our 
analysis, we selected 37 items (Table 2) for our independent variables. 
Thirty-three individual items refer to cheating in general with no possible 
reference to any particular type of assessment. Another four items used as 
independent variables are a matched set: two refer unambiguously to 
exam cheating and two have parallel wording but refer to homework. 
Only the two exam items were used as independent variables in the exam 
cheating model, and only the two homework items were used as indepen­
dent variables in the homework cheating model. The selected independent 
variables were organized into eight blocks according to demographics, 
pre-college cheating behavior, co-curricular participation, and ﬁve blocks 
organized around the TPB. As noted below, variables were checked for ef­
fect size (small, medium, or large) and statistical signiﬁcance in Whitley’s 
(1998) meta-analysis, which was also based on the TPB. All correlations 
listed below are from Whitley (1998) unless otherwise noted. 
The demographics block is composed of age (negative correlation, 
medium eﬀect), gender (males more likely, small eﬀect), socioeconomic 
status (parental education—positive correlation, small eﬀect in a single 
study), year in college (no correlation), and grade point average (nega­
tive correlation, small eﬀect). Our pre-college cheating behavior block is 
a single variable, frequency of high school cheating (related to Whitley’s 
‘‘have cheated in the past’’ (p. 257), positive correlation, large eﬀect). 
Variables in the co-curricular participation block are membership in a 
fraternity or sorority (positive correlation, small eﬀect) and involvement 
in clubs, teams, professional societies, or community service organiza­
tions (positive correlation, small eﬀect). 
There are ﬁve blocks of independent variables organized around our 
theoretical framework: the TPB. Our purpose was to organize our study 
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around a theoretical framework that previous research has shown is 
useful in describing cheating behavior. We separated the block that we 
named moral obligation not to cheat (negative correlation, medium 
eﬀect) from attitudes about cheating per Beck and Ajzen’s (1991) 
adjustment to the TPB when applied to dishonest behaviors. This block 
was a single factor composed of nine items. 
We split the TPB construct of attitude into two blocks. One block, 
general attitudes about cheating, is composed of two factors on attitudes 
about responsibility for cheating. Although Whitley’s meta-analysis 
includes a number of attitudes about cheating, some of which have large 
eﬀects, our survey items did not match the essence of his constructs, 
and so cannot be compared directly. In another block, evaluation of the 
costs and beneﬁts of cheating, we include pressures that students typi­
cally experience: course load (positive correlation, medium eﬀect); fam­
ily responsibilities (this apparently pertinent pressure was not included 
in Whitley’s meta-analysis); employment responsibilities (Whitley 
included an odd dichotomous variable from fewer than ﬁve eﬀect sizes. 
His ﬁnding, a small eﬀect, was that students employed less than full 
time were more likely to cheat.); and means for ﬁnancing education 
(students ‘‘supported by their parents’’ (p. 257) were more likely to 
cheat than an undeﬁned reference case, small eﬀect). Also included in 
this block is a factor of four items that propose a situation in which the 
respondent would be under pressure and ask for a prediction of a deci­
sion to cheat or not. These items embody several eﬀects in Whitley’s 
meta-analysis (p. 257--258): ‘‘feel pressure to get high grades’’ (positive 
correlation, medium eﬀect), are ‘‘faced with important outcomes’’ (posi­
tive correlation, medium eﬀect), ‘‘perceive a higher beneﬁt-to-risk ratio’’ 
(positive correlation, medium eﬀect), and ‘‘perceiving higher competition 
for grades’’ (positive correlation, medium eﬀect). 
The block corresponding to the TPB’s subjective norms is perceived social 
pressures to cheat or not to cheat. In this block, we include predicted feelings 
of embarrassment after a decision to cheat and the deterrent eﬀect of those 
predicted feelings (oppositely related to Whitley’s ‘‘perceive that norms 
allow cheating’’ (p. 257) which had a positive correlation, large eﬀect). 
Our survey’s only reference to the TPB construct of perceived behav­
ioral control was three items referring to perceived eﬀectiveness of 
academic dishonesty policies. In this block, we include three items about 
student and faculty understanding of academic dishonesty policies, fac­
ulty support for those policies, and the deterrent eﬀect of those policies. 
Related items in Whitley’s meta-analysis are: subjection to honor codes 
(negative correlation, medium eﬀect) and ‘‘expect less punishment if 
caught’’ (p. 258) (positive correlation, small eﬀect). 
Rationale for the Selection of the Sample 
Our sample, comprised entirely of engineering undergraduates at 
eleven institutions, is appropriate for our analysis for three reasons. 
First, because students in diﬀerent majors engage in cheating at diﬀerent 
rates, using a sample of students exclusively from one area of study 
controls for students’ major. Second, engineering students self-report 
higher frequencies of cheating than all other majors except for business 
majors, yet, other than our own research (Carpenter et al., 2002; 
Carpenter, Harding, Montgomery, Steneck, and Dey, 2002; Finelli, 
Harding, Carpenter, and Passow, 2003; Harding, 2000, 2001; Harding, 
et al., 2001; Harding, Carpenter, Montgomery, and Steneck, 2002; 
Harding et al., 2003, 2004), we know of only nine studies of cheating 
have speciﬁcally distinguished engineering students from students in 
other majors (Bowers, 1964; Brown, 1994, 1996; Harp and Taietz, 1966; 
McCabe, 1997; Newstead et al., 1996; Shaughnessy, 1988; Singhal, 1982; 
Sisson and Todd-Mancillas, 1984). Of these, only Bowers (1964) and 
McCabe (1997) conducted multi-institutional studies. Third, the impor­
tance of studying cheating among engineering undergraduates (100% of 
our sample) is heightened by nationwide emphases among engineering 
faculty on assessing student learning outcomes and explicitly teaching 
professional ethics. Both of these emphases were codiﬁed in changes 
to the nationwide accreditation requirements for engineering pro­
grams (Moore, 1996) and are still in eﬀect (Engineering Accreditation 
Commission, 2004). 
Rationale for Using Blocked-Hierarchical Analysis 
We had two goals for our analysis: (1) to allow comparison of the 
patterns in the relationships between the independent variables and the 
two dependent variables and (2) to test Ajzen’s TPB for predicting 
cheating behavior. By entering variables into the models in hierarchical 
blocks, we achieved both goals. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Altogether, the TPB includes the three elemental constructs of atti­
tude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. For dishonest 
behaviors such as cheating, moral obligation is an additional construct 
in the theory. We used the TPB, which has proven eﬀective in describ­
ing cheating behavior, as a theoretical framework for organizing our 
independent variables in our models. Based on the items in our survey, 
we represented TPB constructs with ﬁve blocks of variables: moral 
obligation not to cheat; attitudes toward cheating; evaluation of the 
costs and beneﬁts of cheating; perceived social pressures to cheat or not 
to cheat; and perceived eﬀectiveness of academic dishonesty policies. 
Our research addressed three questions: 
1. Which of the constructs represented by these ﬁve blocks of variables 
predict the frequency of cheating on exams among engineering 
students? 
2. Which of the constructs represented by these ﬁve blocks of variables 
predict the frequency of cheating on homework among engineering 
students? 
3. Among engineering students, what are the diﬀerences in the predictive 
power of these constructs for cheating on two diﬀerent types of 
assessments: exams and homework? 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
Survey Instrument, Distribution, and Collection 
Our study is based on data collected during the 2001 calendar year 
using a direct-question survey. After a review of studies of college cheat­
ing (Carpenter et al., 2002), the survey was designed to identify percep­
tions and attitudes about cheating on the types of assessments typical in 
engineering curricula, including exams, homework, and calculator usage. 
Questions were strongly inﬂuenced by Cochran, et al. (1999), McCabe 
and Trevino (1993), and McCabe, Trevino, and Butterﬁeld (1999). The 
survey was designed to incorporate published empirical ﬁndings and was 
not based on theory. The items we selected for this study ﬁtted the TPB. 
The seven-page survey contains 139 questions, subdivided into seven 
parts. Part 1 addresses students’ deﬁnitions of cheating and the 
frequency with which they have engaged in twenty distinct cheating 
behaviors. Parts 2 through 5 investigate attitudes, beliefs, and situa­
tional factors that might aﬀect a student’s decision to cheat or not. Part 
6 addresses deterrents to cheating and students’ perceptions of their 
eﬀectiveness, and Part 7 covers student demographics. We reduced the 
possibility of underreporting due to desirability by posing questions in 
a manner that assumed the behavior had occurred (Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1982). 
Sample: Institutions 
The survey was completed by 695 students (643 undergraduates) 
in engineering and pre-engineering courses at eleven institutions in 
the United States and abroad, including large public universities, small 
private universities, and community colleges (Table 3). Student partici­
pation in the study was voluntary and unmonitored, and the students 
and institutions were informed that results would remain anonymous to 
protect each participant. Institutions were selected based on the willing­
ness of a faculty member to distribute the surveys in a course. Thus, 
our sample of convenience is not necessarily representative of the 
engineering students on any single campus or of the types of institutions 
involved. 
Response Rate 
Because of the informal method of selecting volunteer faculty to dis­
tribute surveys for this study, records that would enable the calculation 
of response rates were not kept. However, in each class in which the sur­
vey was distributed, nearly all students completed the survey—yielding 
an estimated response rate above 90%. Possibly because of the length of 
the survey, several students did not respond to all questions and the re­
sponse rate declined near the end of the survey. For statistical analysis, 
list-wise deletion was used to ensure that our study included only respon­
dents who answered all the items we selected for our analysis. 
TABLE 3. Demographic Information for Institutions in the Data Set 
Number of Percent of Number of 
Carnegie Classiﬁcation (in 2000) respondents respondents institutions 
Doctoral/Research Universities—Extensive 205 29.5 3 
Doctoral/Research Universities—Intensive 42 6.0 1 
Master’s Colleges and Universities I 233 33.5 3 
Associate’s Colleges 42 6.0 2 
Specialized Institutions: Schools of 138 19.9 1 
Engineering and Technology 
International 30 4.3 1 
Institutional Aﬃliation Unknown 5 0.7 -­
for Respondent 
Totals 695 100.0 11 
Sample: Respondents 
The mean age of students in the analytical sample (n=643) was 
21.6 years with a range of 17 to 48 years of age. A total of 81.2% of 
respondents were male and 18.8% female, which is close to U.S. 
national ﬁgures. (In the most recent data published by the National 
Science Board of the National Science Foundation (2004), 20.5% of all 
engineering bachelor’s degrees granted in 2000 were granted to females). 
Information on students’ ethnicity and race was not collected for 
reasons of protecting student identities within small sample subsets. 
There was a wide range of socioeconomic status with parents’ house­
hold incomes ranging from less than $20,000 (7.3% of respondents) to 
more than $200,000 (6.6%) annually. Only 31.3% of respondents indi­
cated their parents were the primary method of paying for college, with 
41.3% paying their own way and 27.5% on scholarship. Most respon­
dents (78.8%) were raised in the United States, including 59.0% who 
were from the Midwest. 
There is a variety of class level in this sample: 22.9% of respondents 
reported they were in their ﬁrst year, 13.7% were in their second year, 
24.1% were in their third year, 21.3% were in their fourth year, and 
18.0% were in their ﬁfth year (or more) of their undergraduate engineer­
ing career. In addition, the discipline of engineering with which the par­
ticipants were aﬃliated represents a wide variety—surveys were 
administered in ﬁrst year engineering or pre-engineering programs and to 
students in electrical, civil, chemical, and mechanical engineering courses. 
The mean grade point average of students in the sample was approxi­
mately a 3.2±0.5 on a 4.0 scale, and a majority of students (59.7%) indi­
cated they typically carried a heavy course load. Some of the respondents 
(12.9%) had at least one dependent, with 3.6% having three or more 
dependents. For this sample, 18.9% of the students were members of a 
fraternity or sorority. Further, 64.1% participated in some form of stu­
dent team, professional society, or community service organization. 
Finally, 29.0% of respondents reported that they never cheated in high 
school, while 60.6% admitted to cheating in high school more than once. 
Variables 
We investigated two dependent variables for this study. Both vari­
ables are summative indices of items from a 20-part question: one 
reﬂecting self-reported frequency of cheating on exams and the other 
reﬂecting self-reported frequency of cheating on homework. The ques­
tion read: ‘‘if you have ever engaged in any of these actions as a college 
student please indicate how many times you have engaged in [it]’’. This 
question was followed by a list of 20 speciﬁc ‘‘cheating’’ behaviors, 
including the thirteen behaviors selected for this study (the behavior 
items are listed in Table 1). The time period for these questions was de­
ﬁned by the question, which asked how many times the respondent en­
gaged in the action ‘‘as a college student’’. The frequency of cheating on 
exams dependent variable was constructed by summing nine items. Sim­
ilarly, the frequency of cheating on homework variable was created by 
summing four items. Dependent variables were standardized for ease of 
interpretation across models and both are normally distributed. 
Independent variables were organized into eight blocks around a the­
oretical framework (Ajzen’s TPB): student demographics (i.e., age, gen­
der, socioeconomic status, year in college, and grade point average); 
pre-college cheating behavior; co-curricular participation (i.e., fraternity 
and sorority membership and club participation); moral obligation not 
to cheat (a single factor composed of nine items); attitudes about cheat­
ing (a two-item factor and a three-item factor); evaluation of the costs 
and beneﬁts of cheating (one four-item factor and four separate items); 
perceived social pressures to cheat or not cheat (two items); and per­
ceived eﬀectiveness of academic dishonesty policies (three items). 
Table 2 presents an overview of independent variables including a 
description of the scale for each item. 
Analysis 
Descriptive and exploratory analyses were performed on the 13 indi­
vidual items which, when summed and standardized, comprise the two 
dependent variables for this study, frequency of cheating on exams and 
frequency of cheating on homework. These analyses identify which 
behaviors the respondents deﬁned as cheating, as unethical but not 
cheating, or as neither unethical nor cheating (Table 1). In order to 
reduce the number of independent variables used in the regression mod­
el, exploratory factor analyses were conducted using principle axis fac­
toring and orthogonal rotation methods. Factor loadings that contained 
a score of at least .69 or higher were used in the development of sub­
sequent summated scales. Internal validity for each of these scales was 
high, with Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities ranging from .69 to .95. 
Table 4 contains a complete description of the four factors used in the 
ﬁnal model for this study. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed to determine 
how the eight blocks of independent variables work together to predict 
the two dependent variables used for this study. Regression diagnostics 
TABLE 4. Variable Names, Loadings and Reliability of Factors Created for this
 
Study
 
Scale and Individual Item Measures Loading Alpha 
Moral obligation not to cheat .95 
Indicate the extent to which you agree. 1=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree 
It is wrong to cheat even if the course material was too hard .89 
It is wrong to cheat even if other students’ scores are not aﬀected .89 
It is wrong to cheat even if I am in danger of failing the class .86 
It is wrong to cheat even if the instructor assigned too much .86 
material 
It is wrong to cheat even if the course material seemed useless .86 
It is wrong for me to cheat even if the instructor does not grade .86 
fairly 
It is wrong to cheat even if the instructor has done an inadequate .85 
job of teaching the course 
It is wrong to cheat even if the instructor didn’t seem to care .84 
if I learned the material 
It is wrong to cheat no matter what the circumstances .79 
Situational cheating—Predicted decision to cheat in situations .87 
when the beneﬁts outweigh the costs 
Indicate the extent to which you agree. 1=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree 
I would cheat if doing so helped me retain ﬁnancial assistance .88 
I would cheat to avoid letting my family down if I failed .87 
I would cheat to avoid getting a poor or failing grade in class .85 
I would cheat in a class if it seemed that everyone else was cheating .82 
Diﬀusion of responsibility for cheating to external sources .80 
Indicate the extent to which you agree. 1=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree 
It is the institution’s responsibility to prevent cheating .87 
It is the instructor’s responsibility to prevent cheating .86 
Personal responsibility for cheating .69 
Indicate the extent to which you agree. 1=Strongly disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree 
If I saw another student cheating, I would report .80 
the student to the instructor 
If I saw another student cheating, I would confront the student .75 
It is my responsibility to prevent cheating .65 
suggested that the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity 
were met. Two variables were recoded for use in the regression model: 
year in college (dummy coded with ﬁrst-year serving as the reference 
group) and means for ﬁnancing education (dummy coded with ‘‘paying 
own way’’ serving as the reference group). In addition, due to the diﬀer­
ent bases for the grade point averages at each institution, we trans­
formed the grade point average variable for each student using the 
mean and standard deviation for that student’s institution and then 
combined these transformations into a single variable for grade point 
average. 
A structured, blocking approach was used to add variables to the 
respective models. This procedure yielded an eight-construct solution for 
each model. Tables 5 and 6 contain a complete description of the stan­
dardized regression coeﬃcients for each variable used in each model. In 
addition, we present the parameter estimates for the ﬁnal models for 
both dependent variables in Table 7 for ease of comparison. 
RESULTS 
Model 1: Frequency of Cheating on Exams 
The ﬁnal model signiﬁcantly predicts 36% of the variance in the 
dependent variable frequency of cheating on exams, F(25, 585)=14.35, 
p<.0001. Five of the eight blocks of variables (i.e., pre-college cheating 
behavior, co-curricular participation, moral obligation not to cheat, 
attitudes about cheating, and evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of 
cheating) contributed signiﬁcantly to this dependent variable. 
Demographics 
The ﬁrst block of variables, demographics, explains 2% of the vari­
ance in the dependent variable, frequency of cheating on exams. The 
only variable that reaches statistical signiﬁcance is year in college: stu­
dents in their ‘‘ﬁfth year (or more)’’ are more likely to report cheating 
on exams than ﬁrst-year students (b=.14, p<.01). 
Pre-college Cheating Behavior 
The second block, which contains a single-item indicator that mea­
sures frequency of cheating in high school, contributes a signiﬁcant 10% 
of the variance in the dependent variable beyond the variance explained 
by demographics. Students who report cheating more often in high 
school also are more likely to report cheating on exams in college 
(b=.32, p<.001). 
Eﬀects for year in college remained signiﬁcant after adding the second 
block of variables. In addition to signiﬁcant diﬀerences between stu­
dents in their ﬁfth year (or more) and ﬁrst-year students, fourth-year 
students are also more likely to report cheating on exams than ﬁrst-year 
students (b=.10, p<.05) after adding pre-college cheating behavior to 
the model. 
Co-curricular Participation 
Controlling for demographics and pre-college cheating behavior, the 
block of variables that included measures of the students’ co-curricular 
participation signiﬁcantly explained an additional 2% of the variance in 
the dependent variable. Students who participated in fraternities and 
sororities were more likely to report cheating on exams than unaﬃliated 
students (b=.11, p<.01). 
Eﬀects for year in college (comparing students in their ‘‘ﬁfth year (or 
more)’’ to ﬁrst-year students and fourth-year students to ﬁrst-year 
students) and pre-college cheating behavior remained statistically signiﬁ­
cant. 
Moral Obligation Not to Cheat 
Students’ moral obligation not to cheat signiﬁcantly explained an 
additional 16% of the variance in the dependent variable beyond the 
variance explained by demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, and 
co-curricular participation. On average, students who believed that 
cheating was wrong were signiﬁcantly less likely to report cheating on 
exams (b=).42, p<.001). After adding this block, year in college diﬀer­
ences, pre-college cheating behavior, and membership in a fraternity or 
sorority remained statistically signiﬁcant. 
Attitudes About Cheating 
Controlling for demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, co-cur­
ricular participation, and moral obligation not to cheat, variables com­
prising the ‘‘attitudes about cheating’’ block signiﬁcantly explained an 
additional 2% of the variance in the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, 
students who felt personally responsible for preventing cheating were 
signiﬁcantly less likely to cheat on exams (b=).13, p<.001). After add­
ing this block, year in college diﬀerences, pre-college cheating behavior, 
T
A
B
L
E
 
5
. 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
B
lo
ck
 
E
n
tr
y
: 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
o
f 
C
h
ea
ti
n
g
 
o
n
 
E
x
a
m
s 
(n
=
5
8
6
) 
B
lo
ck
 
1
 
B
lo
ck
 
2
 
B
lo
ck
 
3
 
B
lo
ck
 
4
 
B
lo
ck
 
5
 
B
lo
ck
 
6
 
B
lo
ck
 
7
 
B
lo
ck
 
8
 
1
. 
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
A
g
e 
)
.0
7
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
3
 
)
.0
4
 
.0
2
 
.0
3
 
.0
3
 
G
en
d
er
 
(M
a
le
) 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
3
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
S
o
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
st
a
tu
s 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
3
 
)
.0
3
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
1
 
Y
ea
r 
in
 
co
ll
eg
e 
S
ec
o
n
d
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.0
4
 
.0
3
 
.0
4
 
.0
5
 
.0
4
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
T
h
ir
d
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.0
2
 
.0
6
 
.0
6
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
9
 
.0
9
 
F
o
u
rt
h
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.0
8
 
.1
0
*
 
.1
1
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
.1
2
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
F
if
th
 
y
ea
r 
o
r 
m
o
re
 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.1
4
*
*
 
.1
7
*
*
*
 
.1
7
*
*
*
 
.1
9
*
*
*
 
.1
8
*
*
*
 
.1
8
*
*
*
 
.1
8
*
*
*
 
.1
8
*
*
*
 
G
ra
d
e 
p
o
in
t 
a
v
er
a
g
e 
)
.0
6
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
2
. 
P
re
-c
o
ll
eg
e 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
b
eh
a
vi
o
r 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
o
f 
h
ig
h
 
sc
h
o
o
l 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
.3
2
*
*
*
 
.3
2
*
*
*
 
.2
3
*
*
*
 
.2
2
*
*
*
 
.1
5
*
*
*
 
.1
5
*
*
*
 
.1
5
*
*
*
 
3
. 
C
o
-c
u
rr
ic
u
la
r 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
F
ra
te
rn
it
y
/s
o
ro
ri
ty
 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 
(N
o
) 
.1
1
*
*
 
.0
9
*
*
 
.0
9
*
*
 
.0
9
*
*
 
.0
7
*
 
.0
7
*
 
C
lu
b
 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
(N
o
) 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
.0
6
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
4
. 
M
o
ra
l 
o
b
li
g
a
ti
o
n
 
n
o
t 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
It
 
is
 
w
ro
n
g
..
.[
F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.4
2
*
*
*
 
)
.3
7
*
*
*
 
)
.2
3
*
*
*
 
)
.2
3
*
*
*
 
)
.2
2
*
*
*
 
5
. 
A
tt
it
u
d
es
 
a
b
o
u
t 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
D
iﬀ
u
si
o
n
 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
.0
1
 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.1
3
*
*
*
 
)
.1
0
*
*
 
)
.0
8
*
 
)
.0
8
*
 
6
. 
E
va
lu
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
co
st
s 
a
n
d
 
b
en
eﬁ
ts
 
o
f 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
p
re
ss
u
re
s 
C
o
u
rs
e 
lo
a
d
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
H
ea
v
y
 
fa
m
il
y
 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
(N
o
) 
.0
2
 
.0
3
 
.0
3
 
H
o
u
rs
/w
ee
k
 
sp
en
t 
w
o
rk
in
g
 
.0
0
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
1
 
M
ea
n
s 
fo
r
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
S
ch
o
la
rs
h
ip
 
(P
a
y
 
o
w
n
 
w
a
y
) 
.1
3
*
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
*
 
.1
2
*
*
 
P
a
re
n
ts
 
(P
a
y
 
o
w
n
 
w
a
y
) 
.0
4
 
.0
4
 
.0
4
 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
.3
1
*
*
*
 
.2
9
*
*
*
 
.2
9
*
*
*
 
7
. 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
so
ci
a
l 
p
re
ss
u
re
s 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
o
r 
n
o
t 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
-e
m
b
a
rr
a
ss
m
en
t 
)
.0
8
 
)
.0
8
 
D
et
er
re
n
t 
eﬀ
ec
t-
em
b
a
rr
a
ss
m
en
t 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
8
. 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
eﬀ
ec
ti
ve
n
es
s 
o
f 
a
ca
d
em
ic
 
d
is
h
o
n
es
ty
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 
a
n
d
 
fa
cu
lt
y
 
u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
)
.0
0
 
F
a
cu
lt
y
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 
o
f 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
)
.0
3
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
d
is
h
o
n
es
ty
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
d
et
er
 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
)
.0
0
 
M
o
d
el
 
st
a
ti
st
ic
s 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 
R
2
 
.0
1
 
.1
1
 
.1
2
 
.2
8
 
.3
0
 
.3
6
 
.3
6
 
.3
6
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
in
 
R
2
 
.0
2
 
.1
0
*
*
*
 
.0
2
*
*
 
.1
6
*
*
*
 
.0
2
*
*
 
.0
7
*
*
*
 
.0
0
 
.0
0
 
P
a
re
n
th
es
es
 
in
d
ic
a
te
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
g
ro
u
p
 
fo
r 
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
. 
*
p
<
.0
5
, 
*
*
p
<
.0
1
, 
*
*
*
p
<
.0
0
1
. 
T
A
B
L
E
 
6
. 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 
B
lo
ck
 
E
n
tr
y
: 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
o
f 
C
h
ea
ti
n
g
 
o
n
 
H
o
m
ew
o
rk
 
(n
=
5
9
0
) 
B
lo
ck
 
1
 
B
lo
ck
 
2
 
B
lo
ck
 
3
 
B
lo
ck
 
4
 
B
lo
ck
 
5
 
B
lo
ck
 
6
 
B
lo
ck
 
7
 
B
lo
ck
 
8
 
1
. 
D
em
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s 
A
g
e 
.0
7
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.0
7
 
G
en
d
er
 
(M
a
le
) 
.0
8
 
.0
7
 
.0
7
 
.0
6
 
.0
6
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
S
o
ci
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
st
a
tu
s 
)
.0
6
 
)
.0
6
 
)
.0
6
 
)
.0
7
 
)
.0
7
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
Y
ea
r 
in
 
co
ll
eg
e 
S
ec
o
n
d
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.0
9
 
.0
9
 
.0
9
 
.1
0
*
 
.1
0
*
 
.0
8
 
.0
9
 
.0
9
*
 
T
h
ir
d
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
.0
5
 
.0
6
 
.0
6
 
.0
7
 
.0
7
 
.0
7
 
.0
8
 
.0
9
 
F
o
u
rt
h
 
y
ea
r 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
1
 
.0
0
 
.0
1
 
.0
1
 
.0
1
 
.0
2
 
.0
3
 
F
if
th
 
y
ea
r 
o
r 
m
o
re
 
(F
ir
st
 
y
ea
r)
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
G
ra
d
e 
p
o
in
t 
a
v
er
a
g
e 
)
.0
9
*
 
)
.0
8
*
 
)
.0
8
*
 
)
.0
6
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
)
.0
5
 
2
. 
P
re
-c
o
ll
eg
e 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
b
eh
a
vi
o
r 
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
o
f 
h
ig
h
 
sc
h
o
o
l 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
.0
7
 
.0
7
 
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
3
 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
5
 
3
. 
C
o
-c
u
rr
ic
u
la
r 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
F
ra
te
rn
it
y
/s
o
ro
ri
ty
 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 
(N
o
) 
.0
5
 
.0
4
 
.0
4
 
.0
4
 
.0
3
 
.0
2
 
C
lu
b
 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
(N
o
) 
.0
1
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
4
. 
M
o
ra
l 
o
b
li
g
a
ti
o
n
 
n
o
t 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
It
 
is
 
w
ro
n
g
..
.[
F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.3
1
*
*
*
 
)
.3
0
*
*
*
 
)
.2
4
*
*
*
 
)
.2
3
*
*
*
 
)
.2
2
*
*
*
 
5
. 
A
tt
it
u
d
es
 
a
b
o
u
t 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
D
iﬀ
u
si
o
n
 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
)
.0
4
 
.0
1
 
.0
0
 
)
.0
1
 
6
. 
E
va
lu
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
co
st
s 
a
n
d
 
b
en
eﬁ
ts
 
o
f 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
p
re
ss
u
re
s 
C
o
u
rs
e 
lo
a
d
 
)
.0
1
 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
2
 
H
ea
v
y
 
fa
m
il
y
 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
(N
o
) 
)
.0
1
 
.0
0
 
)
.0
0
 
H
o
u
rs
/w
ee
k
 
sp
en
t 
w
o
rk
in
g
 
.0
7
 
.0
6
 
.0
7
 
M
ea
n
s 
fo
r
ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
n
g
 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
S
ch
o
la
rs
h
ip
 
(P
a
y
 
o
w
n
 
w
a
y
) 
.0
0
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
P
a
re
n
ts
 
(P
a
y
 
o
w
n
 
w
a
y
) 
)
.0
2
 
)
.0
0
 
)
.0
1
 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
[F
a
ct
o
r]
 
.1
4
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
.1
3
*
*
 
7
. 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
so
ci
a
l 
p
re
ss
u
re
s 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
o
r 
n
o
t 
to
 
ch
ea
t 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
-e
m
b
a
rr
a
ss
m
en
t 
)
.0
6
 
.0
7
 
D
et
er
re
n
t 
eﬀ
ec
t-
em
b
a
rr
a
ss
m
en
t 
)
.0
4
 
)
.0
5
 
8
. 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
eﬀ
ec
ti
ve
n
es
s 
o
f 
a
ca
d
em
ic
 
d
is
h
o
n
es
ty
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
S
tu
d
en
ts
 
a
n
d
 
fa
cu
lt
y
 
u
n
d
er
st
a
n
d
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
)
.0
6
 
F
a
cu
lt
y
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 
o
f 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
)
.0
8
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
d
is
h
o
n
es
ty
 
p
o
li
ci
es
 
d
et
er
 
ch
ea
ti
n
g
 
.1
1
*
*
 
M
o
d
el
 
st
a
ti
st
ic
s 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 
R
2
 
.0
2
 
.0
3
 
.0
3
 
.1
2
 
.1
2
 
.1
2
 
.1
3
 
.1
4
 
C
h
a
n
g
e 
in
 
R
2
 
.0
4
*
*
 
.0
1
 
.0
0
 
.0
9
*
*
*
 
.0
0
 
.0
2
 
.0
1
 
.0
2
*
 
P
a
re
n
th
es
es
 
in
d
ic
a
te
 
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
g
ro
u
p
 
fo
r 
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
. 
*
p
<
.0
5
, 
*
*
p
<
.0
1
, 
*
*
*
p
<
.0
0
1
. 
membership in a fraternity or sorority, and moral obligation not to 
cheat remained statistically signiﬁcant. 
Evaluation of the Costs and Beneﬁts of Cheating 
Controlling for demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, co-cur­
ricular participation, moral obligation not to cheat, and attitudes about 
cheating, items comprising the ‘‘evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of 
cheating’’ block signiﬁcantly explained an additional 7% of the variance 
in the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, students on scholarship were 
more likely to report cheating on exams than students who paid for col­
lege on their own (b=.13, p<.001). Similarly, student who agreed that 
‘‘I would cheat...[to alleviate a stressful situation]’’ such as to maintain 
ﬁnancial assistance, to avoid failing, to avoid letting their family down, 
and to go along with the crowd were signiﬁcantly more likely to cheat 
on exams (b=.31, p<.001). 
All of the aforementioned variables making up year in college, pre­
college cheating behavior, moral obligation not to cheat, and attitudes 
about cheating remained statistically signiﬁcant. 
Perceived Social Pressures and Perceived Eﬀectiveness 
of Academic Dishonesty Policies 
Variables making up the remaining blocks, ‘‘perceived social pressures 
to cheat or not to cheat’’ and ‘‘perceived eﬀectiveness of academic 
dishonesty policies’’ explained 0% of additional variance in the depen­
dent variable beyond the variance explained by the ﬁrst six blocks of 
variables in the model. Consistent with our other ﬁndings, eﬀects of the 
aforementioned variables making up year in college, pre-college cheating 
behavior, moral obligation not to cheat, attitudes about cheating, and 
evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of cheating remained statistically 
signiﬁcant. 
Model 2: Frequency of Cheating on Homework 
The ﬁnal model signiﬁcantly predicts 14% of the variance in the 
dependent variable, frequency of cheating on homework, F(25, 
589)=4.80, p<.0001. Three of the eight blocks of variables (i.e., demo­
graphics, moral obligation not to cheat, and perceived eﬀectiveness of 
academic dishonesty policies) contributed signiﬁcantly to explaining the 
variance in this dependent variable. 
Demographics 
The ﬁrst block of variables measuring demographics explains a signiﬁ­
cant 4% of the variance in the dependent variable, frequency of cheat­
ing on homework. Students with higher grade point averages are less 
likely to report cheating on homework (b=).09, p<.05). 
Pre-college Cheating Behavior 
The second block containing a single-item indicator that measures 
frequency of cheating in high school contributes only 1% of the vari­
ance in the dependent variable beyond the variance explained by demo­
graphics. Eﬀects for self-reported grade point average remained 
signiﬁcant after adding the second block of variables. 
Co-curricular Participation 
Controlling for demographics and pre-college cheating behavior, the 
block of variables that included measures of co-curricular participation 
did not explain any additional variance in the dependent variable. 
Eﬀects for grade point average stayed the same. 
Moral Obligation Not to Cheat 
Students’ moral obligation not to cheat signiﬁcantly explained an 
additional 9% of the variance in the dependent variable beyond the 
variance explained by demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, and 
co-curricular participation. On average, students who reported that 
cheating was ‘‘wrong’’ were signiﬁcantly less likely to report cheating on 
homework (b=).31, p<.001). Eﬀects for year in college (second-year 
students compared to ﬁrst-year students) became statistically signiﬁcant 
after adding this block (b=.10, p<.05), meaning that when compared 
with ﬁrst-year students, second-year students are signiﬁcantly more like­
ly to report cheating on homework. However, grade point average was 
driven out of statistical signiﬁcance. 
Attitudes About Cheating 
Controlling for demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, co-cur­
ricular participation, and moral obligation not to cheat, variables com­
prising attitudes about cheating signiﬁcantly explained an additional 0% 
of the variance in the dependent variable. Eﬀects for both year in col­
lege (second-year students compared to ﬁrst-year students) and moral 
obligation not to cheat remained statistically signiﬁcant predictors of the 
dependent variable, even after adding this new block of variables. 
Evaluation of the Costs and Beneﬁts of Cheating 
Controlling for demographics, pre-college cheating behavior, co-cur­
ricular participation, moral obligation not to cheat, and attitudes about 
cheating, items comprising the ‘‘evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of 
cheating’’ block explained an additional 2% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, students who agreed that ‘‘I would 
cheat...[to alleviate a stressful situation]’’ (i.e., in situations when the 
respondent deemed the beneﬁts of cheating outweighed the costs) were 
more likely to report cheating on homework (b=.14, p<.01). 
After adding this additional set of variables into the model, the eﬀects 
of students’ moral obligation not to cheat remained statistically signiﬁ­
cant. However, the diﬀerence in cheating on homework between second-
year students and ﬁrst-year students fell out of signiﬁcance. 
Perceived Social Pressures to Cheat or Not to Cheat 
Variables making up the block ‘‘perceived social pressures to cheat 
or not to cheat’’ explained an additional 1% of the variance in the 
dependent variable beyond the variance explained by the ﬁrst six blocks 
of variables in the model. Consistent with our other ﬁndings, eﬀects of 
students’ moral obligation not to cheat and evaluation of the costs and 
beneﬁts of cheating remained statistically signiﬁcant. 
Perceived Eﬀectiveness of Academic Dishonesty Policies 
Controlling for all other variables in the model, the remaining block, 
‘‘perceived eﬀectiveness of academic integrity policies,’’ signiﬁcantly 
explained 2% of additional variance in homework cheating beyond the 
variance explained by the ﬁrst seven blocks of variables in the model. 
Students who believed that the academic policies at the institution 
deterred cheating were more likely to report cheating on homework 
(b=.11, p<.01). 
After adding this block of variables to the model, one eﬀect of year in 
college became statistically signiﬁcant: second-year students are more 
likely to report cheating than ﬁrst-year students. Consistent with our 
other ﬁndings, students’ moral obligation not to cheat and the afore­
mentioned signiﬁcant variable from the student’s evaluation of the costs 
and beneﬁts of cheating remained statistically signiﬁcant. 
DISCUSSION 
Correlates of Cheating Vary by Type of Assessment 
The diﬀerences in the regression models for exam cheating and home­
work cheating (Table 7) clearly demonstrate that correlates of cheating 
vary by type of assessment. Evidence that correlates of cheating vary by 
type of assessment is the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the six 
independent variables that predict either frequency of cheating behavior 
for exams and for homework but do not predict both (i.e., year in 
college, pre-college cheating behavior, fraternity/sorority membership, 
personal responsibility for cheating, means for ﬁnancing college, and 
academic dishonesty policies deter cheating). Further evidence is the 
diﬀerence in the percentage of the variance explained by the parallel 
models (36% for exam cheating and 14% for homework cheating). This 
dramatic diﬀerence indicates that the factors selected for this model pre­
dict exam cheating well but that other factors not included in the model 
must also contribute to predictions of homework cheating; in other 
words, the diﬀerence in how well the model ﬁts each variable demon­
strates that frequency of exam cheating is a diﬀerent construct than 
frequency of homework cheating. 
Cheating patterns vary by year in college. First-year students reported 
the least frequent cheating on both exams and homework. Although 4th 
year and 5th year undergraduates cheat signiﬁcantly more than ﬁrst 
year students on exams, second year undergraduates cheat signiﬁcantly 
more than ﬁrst year students on homework. Perhaps cheaters are 
dishonest on a type of assessment with a lower risk of detection (such as 
homework) in their early years at college and progress to cheating on 
higher-beneﬁt, but higher-risk assessments (such as exams) in their later 
years at college as they develop skill at cheating without detection. This 
is consistent with the TPB (Ajzen, 1991) because in typical engineering 
courses, exam scores make up the majority of the course grade while 
homework is worth a small percentage of the course grade. However, 
the wording of the survey item complicates this explanation because if 
respondents carefully interpreted our survey question (‘‘if you have ever 
engaged in any of these actions as a college student please indicate how 
many times you have engaged in [it]’’) as a cumulative total of all their 
cheating during college, a student who cheats at a steady annual rate 
would report an increased number of engagements with each passing 
year. Alternately, if many respondents misinterpreted this question as 
pertaining to a shorter period, such as an academic year or a semester, 
TABLE 7. Comparison of Unstandardized B-Weights between Dependent Variable 
in the Two Models (for Block 8), Exam and Homework 
Exam Homework 
1. Demographics 
Age .01 .02 
Gender (Male) ).11 .12 
Socioeconomic status ).01 ).04 
Year in college 
Second year (First year) .05 .27* 
Third year (First year) .20* .20 
Fourth year (First year) .31** .08 
Fifth year or more (First year) .46*** ).00 
Grade point average ).00 ).05 
2. Pre-college cheating behavior 
Frequency of high school cheating .16*** ).05 
3. Co-curricular participation 
Fraternity/sorority membership (No) .18* .06 
Club participation (No) .10 .04 
4. Moral obligation not to cheat 
It is wrong...[Factor] ).22*** ).21*** 
5. Attitudes about cheating 
Diﬀusion of responsibility [Factor] .01 ).02 
Personal responsibility [Factor] ).14* ).01 
6. Evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of cheating 
Personal pressures 
Course load .09 ).03 
Heavy family responsibility (No) .06 ).00 
Hours/week spent working ).00 .04 
Means for ﬁnancing education 
Scholarship (Pay own way) .27** .05 
Parents (Pay own way) .09 ).01 
Situational cheating [Factor] .29*** .13** 
7. Perceived social pressures to cheat or not to cheat 
Prediction of consequence-embarrassment ).10 ).09 
Deterrent eﬀect—embarrassment .02 ).06 
8. Perceived eﬀectiveness of academic dishonesty policies 
Students and faculty understand policies ).01 ).11 
Faculty support of policies ).04 ).12 
Academic dishonesty policies deter cheating ).00 .16** 
Model statistics 
Adjusted R2 .36 .14 
Parentheses indicate reference group for comparison. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
as suggested by McCabe (personal communication, April 1, 2002), the 
results would strongly support our explanation. 
The frequency of high school cheating strongly predicted exam cheat­
ing but not homework cheating. We propose that frequent high school 
cheating changes a college student’s evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts 
of cheating by developing skill at cheating without detection (which 
would both demonstrate the beneﬁt of cheating and reduce the actual 
risk of detection). Because the beneﬁts of cheating on exams are typi­
cally greater than the beneﬁts of cheating on homework in engineering 
courses, an experienced cheater would be more likely to engage directly 
in the type of cheating with the highest beneﬁt, cheating on exams. This 
is consistent with the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). 
Similarly, fraternity/sorority membership predicted exam cheating but 
not homework cheating. We propose that fraternity/sorority member­
ship might allow a group of students to pool their cheating experience 
in a manner that allows inexperienced cheaters to observe the beneﬁts of 
cheating and to reduce the actual risk of detection, much like personal 
cheating experience would, which is consistent with the TPB (Ajzen, 
1991). 
Students who reported feeling personal responsibility to report and 
prevent cheating were signiﬁcantly less likely to report cheating on 
exams. This seems natural because students who assume more personal 
responsibility to prevent cheating might well begin their eﬀorts with 
themselves and be less likely to cheat. By this reasoning we would 
expect to see a similar relationship for cheating on homework, however, 
no such relationship was found. We speculate that the wording of ques­
tions about personal responsibility focused students’ thoughts on the 
public nature of exam performance versus the private nature of home­
work activity. For example, two of the questions were worded in the 
form ‘‘If I saw another student cheating, I would ...’’. It would be 
unlikely to ‘‘see’’ a cheater in action outside of an exam situation. Thus, 
these questions may have evoked students’ deﬁnitions of exam cheating. 
Multiple researchers have shown that students’ deﬁnitions of what 
behaviors constitute cheating vary widely (e.g., Stern and Havlicek, 
1986), and our survey respondents classiﬁed ‘‘cheating’’ behaviors dur­
ing exams much more crisply than ‘‘cheating’’ behaviors on homework 
(Table 1). This may explain why students’ personal responsibility for 
cheating did not have a relationship with homework cheating. 
Scholarship students were more likely to cheat on exams than were 
students who reported paying their own way, but this distinction was 
not observed for homework cheating. We propose that scholarship stu­
dents are often under ﬁnancial pressure to maintain a minimum grade 
point average and that the beneﬁt of achieving a higher grade on an 
exam is much greater than the beneﬁt of achieving a higher grade on a 
homework assignment in typical engineering classes. Thus, scholarship 
students would not be likely to see a beneﬁt to cheating on homework 
when they evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of cheating, which is consis­
tent with the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). 
The deterrent eﬀect of academic dishonesty policies diﬀerentially pre­
dicted cheating on exams and homework. Counterintuitively, students 
who agreed that ‘‘academic dishonesty policies at your institution deter 
cheating’’ were more likely to report cheating on homework. We specu­
late that students feel that enforced academic dishonesty policies would 
deter their cheating; however, in the absence of enforced policies, they 
do cheat on types of assessments for which policies are least deﬁned and 
enforced, such as homework. Responses to a question on the survey 
that was not included in our models indicate that students feel that aca­
demic dishonesty policies are not enforced at their institutions (In this 
sample, when answering the question ‘‘Do faculty support the academic 
dishonesty policies of your institution?’’, 48.8% answered either ‘‘not at 
all’’ or ‘‘somewhat’’). Implicit policies on exam cheating, and their occa­
sional enforcement, may explain why this eﬀect is seen for homework 
cheating but not exam cheating. 
Unilateral Deterrents to Cheating: Moral Obligation 
and Situational Cheating 
Two factors showed a strong deterrent eﬀect to cheating in both types 
of assessment: moral obligation not to cheat and situational cheating. 
The moral obligation not to cheat had the most explanatory power of 
any block of variables in the regression models, signiﬁcantly explaining 
16% of the variance in cheating on exams and 9% of the variance in 
cheating on homework. (Note that these percentages are much larger 
than the 3% of the variance in Beck and Ajzen’s (1991) regression mod­
el for cheating.) The percentages of the variance explained by moral 
obligation in our models strongly support Beck and Ajzen’s proposal 
that moral obligation plays an important role in the TPB for dishonest 
acts. Speciﬁcally, a student’s agreement that ‘‘It is wrong to cheat even 
if [diﬃcult circumstance]...’’ is strongly negatively correlated with both 
the ‘‘frequency of cheating on exams’’ and ‘‘the frequency of cheating 
on homework’’. Looking at this result conversely, students who dis­
agreed with these statements ‘‘recognize and accept cheating as an unde­
sirable behavior; however, its occurrence can be excused in certain 
instances’’ (Haines, Diekhoﬀ, LaBeﬀ, and Clark, 1986, p. 353). This 
attitude, called neutralization, has been found to be an important inﬂu­
ence on college students’ cheating behavior (e.g., Haines et al., 1986; 
Liska, 1978). Our results also support this ﬁnding. 
Student agreement with statements that ‘‘I would cheat...[if it helped 
me alleviate a stressful situation]’’ is positively correlated with the fre­
quency of cheating on both types of assessment. This is a logical result 
because stressful situations that might be alleviated by (undetected) 
cheating could be alleviated by cheating on any type of assessment. 
Summary 
Our major ﬁnding is that correlates of cheating vary by type of 
assessment. This ﬁnding is consistent with several aspects of previous 
work, notably: (1) the TPB (Ajzen, 1991) which implies that each con­
struct that contributes to actual behavior will vary by situation; (2) 
diﬀerences in prevalence of cheating by type of assessment (e.g., Baird, 
1980; Bowers, 1964; Brown, 1996; Diekhoﬀ et al., 1996; Hanson, 1990; 
Jensen et al., 2002; McCabe, 1997; Michaels and Miethe, 1989; 
Stearns, 2001; Storch and Storch, 2002; data from McCabe’s 1993 
study reported in Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002); (3) diﬀerences 
identiﬁed in the relationships in four diﬀerent path models for four 
diﬀerent cheating situations (Pratt and McLaughlin, 1989); (4) con­
cerns about the common practice in cheating research of combining 
cheating behaviors for diﬀerent types of assessments (Crown and Spil­
ler, 1998; Thorpe et al., 1999; Whitley, 1998); (5) published diﬃculties 
in creating general deﬁnitions for cheating and academic dishonesty 
without specifying situations and behaviors (e.g., Ratner, 1996), and 
(6) published classiﬁcations of cheating behaviors by type of assess­
ment for practical applications of cheating research, such as prevention 
and detection, policy, working deﬁnitions, and strategies for teachers 
who must deal with academic dishonesty (Cizek, 1999; Lipson and 
McGavern, 1993; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002). Future research on 
cheating should carefully distinguish between behaviors on diﬀerent 
types of assessment. 
Our secondary ﬁndings are that a student’s conviction that cheating is 
wrong no matter what the circumstances is a strong deterrent to cheat­
ing across types of assessment and that a student who agrees that he or 
she would cheat in order to alleviate stressful situations is more likely to 
cheat on exams and on homework. Future research on cheating should 
explore students’ moral obligation not to cheat and their moral develop­
ment. 
LIMITATIONS
 
The sample of convenience is not necessarily representative of the 
engineering students on any single campus or of the types of institutions 
involved. The sample of convenience also created a situation in which 
records that would enable the calculation of response rates were not 
kept. If our survey had been designed based on the TPB, a fuller 
complement of variables would have addressed the TPB constructs of 
subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Since the 1960’s, upwards of 80% of U.S. undergraduates report that 
they have cheated during college, although rates vary by college major. 
Yet the severity of the cheating is increasing: ‘‘for example, students 
admitting to copying from another student on an examination doubled 
from 26% to 52% between 1963 and 1993’’ (McCabe, 1997, p. 435). 
The prevalence and increasing severity of cheating should be distressing 
to educators because of their implications for: (1) undermining institu­
tional missions that include preparation for citizenship and service to 
society, each of which has a moral dimension (King and Mayhew, 2002; 
Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002); (2) invalidating measures of student 
learning and grading equity (Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002); (3) 
damaging student and faculty morale, the reputation of the institution, 
and public conﬁdence in higher education (Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 
2002); and (4) increasing the likelihood of engagement in dishonest acts 
both outside the classroom and after graduation (e.g., Baldwin et al., 
1996; Beck and Ajzen, 1991; Nonis and Swift, 2001). These four impli­
cations of the prevalence and severity of cheating have inspired a sub­
stantial body of research on cheating among college students, including 
eleven review articles published since 1977 (Brown and Emmett, 2001; 
Bushway and Nash, 1977; Cizek, 1999; Cole and McCabe, 1996; Crown 
and Spiller, 1998; Dowd, 1992; Kibler, 1993; McCabe et al., 2001; 
Whitley, 1998; Whitley and Keith-Spiegel, 2002; Whitley et al., 1999). 
Our study ﬁlls several gaps in the existing literature on student cheating. 
Separate models for cheating behavior are made for two types of assess­
ment, exams and homework. Both the careful distinction between the 
types of assessment and also the distinct study of homework are rare 
contributions to research on cheating. Also, our sample of engineering 
undergraduates is an important contribution because engineering students 
self-report higher frequencies of cheating than all other majors except for 
business majors (e.g., McCabe, 1997), yet only two multi-institutional 
studies of cheating other than our own have speciﬁcally identiﬁed engi­
neering students (Bowers, 1964; McCabe, 1997). The importance of study­
ing cheating among engineering undergraduates is heightened by 
nationwide emphases among engineering faculty on assessing student 
learning outcomes and explicitly teaching professional ethics. Both of 
these emphases were codiﬁed in changes to the nationwide accreditation 
requirements for engineering programs (Moore, 1996). 
In this study, we found that students don’t see cheating as a single 
construct and their decisions to cheat or not to cheat are inﬂuenced diﬀer­
ently depending on the type of assessment. Therefore, faculty and admin­
istrators should carefully deﬁne for students what does and does not 
constitute cheating for each type of assessment, such as exams, home­
work, term papers, projects, laboratory reports, and oral presentations. 
Explicit deﬁnitions of ‘‘cheating’’ seem especially appropriate because of 
the recent emphasis on collaborative learning, which communicates to 
students that working together is often encouraged by faculty. 
In addition, we found that a student’s conviction that cheating is 
wrong no matter what the circumstances is a deterrent to cheating across 
types of assessment and that a student who agrees that they would cheat 
in order to alleviate stressful situations is more likely to cheat on exams 
and on homework. Thus, interventions that develop student understand­
ing that cheating is wrong could deter all forms of cheating, if clear 
deﬁnitions of cheating are communicated to students. 
Our ﬁndings have two implications for future research on cheating. 
First, future research on cheating should carefully word each behavior 
as speciﬁcally for one type of assessment. Second, future research 
should explore students’ moral obligation not to cheat and their moral 
development. 
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END NOTES 
1. We recognize that	 some cheating may not be planned. For example situations in which 
cheating might not be planned (such as a student observing, during an exam, that a neigh­
bor’s paper is available) see Hetherington and Feldman (1964). 
2. Note that ‘‘Ajzen’’ recently changed his name to ‘‘Aizen’’. Armitage and Conner (2001) 
describe this in a footnoted personal communication dated November 8, 1999. 
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